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Uncertainty and
Growth of the Firm
ABSTRACT.  Using data from a survey of 1,097 small and
medium-sized non-listed Dutch firms we investigate the
relation between growth of the firm and uncertainty. We focus
on the impact of sales uncertainty on various types of
investment. We find that sales uncertainty, measured by the
conditional variance, has a mixed impact on various invest-
ment decisions. We include an analysis of the relevance of
financial structure and firm size on the growth-uncertainty
relation.
1.  Introduction
How does uncertainty affect growth of the firm?
The interest for the impact of uncertainty is raised
by recent advances in the literature on the invest-
ment-uncertainty relation (see Dixit and Pindyck,
1994). Uncertainty can lead to an increase of
investment activity if managers are risk neutral
and firms operate in perfect competitive markets.
On the other hand with risk aversion and market
power it is likely that uncertainty hampers growth.
The sign of the investment-uncertainty relation has
attracted both theoretical and empirical attention
in the last decades. Whereas the sign is ambiguous
from a theoretical point of view, most empirical
studies provide support for a negative effect of
uncertainty on investment (see for instance
Aizenman and Marion, 1993; Bell and Campa,
1997; Caballero and Pindyck, 1996; Ferderer,
1993a, b; Leahy and Whited, 1996; Pattillo, 1998;
Pindyck, 1986; Pindyck and Solimano, 1993; and
Price, 1996). 
Most studies use historical data to proxy future
uncertainty. However, it is likely that an ex post
measure of uncertainty does not reflect entrepre-
neurs’ subjective perception of risk. To come
around this problem, Guiso and Parigi (1999)
proposed to proxy the firms’ risk perception using
results of an interview study. Managers of firms
are asked for their subjective ideas on the vari-
ability of future demand for their products. Pattillo
(1998) uses a similar strategy in her study on the
investment-uncertainty relationship for Ghana. In
this paper we follow a similar approach for Dutch
firms. More specifically, we interviewed Dutch
firms about their investment plans, their expecta-
tions regarding future sales, the financial position,
etc. in order to investigate whether uncertainty has
a positive or negative effect on firm growth in
general and investment in particular. We approx-
imate growth of the firm by various types of
investment. Moreover, we have information on the
financial positions of the firms (measured by
variables like solvability, current Return on Assets
(ROA), and demand for external financing). This
implies that we can test the hypothesis that finan-
cial imperfections have an impact on the invest-
ment-uncertainty relationship. 
We start in Section 2 with a short survey of the
literature on investment and uncertainty. Section
3 explains the interview study, including the
measurement of indicators of uncertainty. The
survey contains 1,100 records of firms on the plant
level. We include firms of various sizes. The
majority of the firms have less than 100
employees, which indicates that we address a
small firm’s growth decision. The survey was
carried out in 1999. Section 4 presents the main
estimation results. Section 5 analyses the special
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cases of the impact of financial structure and firm
size. Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
2.  The impact of uncertainty
The investment decision is mostly taken under
genuine uncertainty. Some economists believe that
the investor is tortured by fundamental uncertainty
(Knight, 1921), which implies that the investor is
not able even to give a subjective probability
function of all possible outcomes. This might
easily lead to the well-known Keynesian animal
spirits in investment. For modelling purposes the
Knightian uncertainty is killing though, so we
abstract from fundamental uncertainty. Here we do
assume that the investor is able to formulate a
density function of all outcomes, which implies
that the investor can analyse future prospects of
the investment project. 
The literature is ambiguous about the sign of
the investment-uncertainty relationship. The fol-
lowing characteristics influence the sign:
1. The degree of product market competition. If
an entrepreneur faces perfect competition there
is a greater likelihood that uncertainty will
affect investment positively (Abel, 1983; and
Hartman, 1972). 
2. The degree of returns to scale. Caballero
(1991) argues that the positive correlation
between investment and uncertainty based on
the Hartman-Abel prediction is traceable to the
assumptions of perfect competition and
constant returns to scale. However, with
increasing returns to scale the entrepreneur will
dislike uncertainty more, since there are
decreasing marginal costs. 
3. The degree of risk aversion. Risk loving entre-
preneurs will react positively on more uncer-
tainty, whereas risk-averse entrepreneurs react
negatively to more uncertainty (Nickell, 1978).
4. Irreversibility of investment. An investor who
faces high costs of reverting investment will
probably not invest and wait until more infor-
mation is revealed to the market (Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994).
5. The possibilities to obtain external credit. The
probability of a negative investment-uncer-
tainty relationship increases the more a firm
is financially constrained (Ghosal and
Loungani, 1997). A risk-averse creditor (see
also the third argument) will be more reluc-
tant to supply credit in times of large uncer-
tainty.
The modern theory of investment under uncer-
tainty emphasises costly reversibility of invest-
ment. The irreversibility property of investment is
relevant to explaining investment behaviour only
when investment decisions are made under uncer-
tainty. Within the framework of irreversibility
investment opportunities are seen as call options
on real assets. The firm has the right but not the
obligation to buy the sequence of cash flows that
are generated by the investment project in the
future by paying a certain amount of investment
costs. The key assumptions of the real option
approach to investment behaviour are the exis-
tence of irreversibility and the possibility to delay
investment. If investment decisions are irre-
versible, investment will be more sensitive to
uncertainty facing the firm. Since the firm that has
more irreversible capital has a higher opportunity
cost of capital (including the option value of
investing right now), the firm will require a higher
marginal revenue product of capital to match the
trigger of investment. Therefore waiting is highly
demanded to obtain new information. Con-
sequently, uncertainty directly affects the threshold
that triggers the occurrence of investment through
which it affects the timing decision of investment
and hence the scale of investment at a specific
point in time (Bernanke, 1983; McDonald and
Siegel, 1986; Pindyck, 1991; Dixit and Pindyck,
1994). It should be noted here that although uncer-
tainty probably increases the threshold to trigger
investment, a firm might invest more than it would
do in a certain environment once the trigger is
reached. If there are mainly fixed costs to adding
capacity it might be worthwhile to over-invest in
capacity holding valuable operating options. So
uncertainty affects both the trigger and (once the
trigger has been pulled) it might have an impact
on the size of the investment. Moreover, as Sarkar
(2000) shows, an increase in uncertainty also
increases the probability to hit the trigger. So it is
worthwhile to investigate the decision to invest (or
not) and the decision how much to invest. 
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3.  The survey
This paper uses data from an annual survey among
a panel of Dutch firms. The survey is carried out
by the Department of Spatial Sciences of the
University of Groningen. In the 1999 edition of
this survey we added a number of questions on
investment, employment growth, and expected
uncertainty. The main topic of the survey is the
analysis of location strategies. The survey was
mailed to 1,967 panel members, of which 903
(45.9%) responded. In order to compensate for the
“death” of panel members, unwillingness to
continue panel participation, and retirement or job
change of the contact person, another 2,695 firms
were mailed in a second round of the survey. The
latter resulted in 197 questionnaire forms or a
response rate of 7.3%, which is more in line with
response rates that are generally observed in
written questionnaires amongst private firms. Due
to missing values not all of the 1,100 observations
are useful. The question on sales expectations, a
crucial item for our paper, had a response rate of
85%.
It is good to note that data are collected on the
level of individual firm establishments as opposed
to the company or other organisational level. This
makes this survey valuable for the analysis of
investment, because the plant manager is most
likely responsible for the investment decisions.
The sectors strongly represented in the research
group include industry (29%) and business
services (22%), followed by wholesale (17%) and
construction (15%). Smaller segments include
retail and restaurants (10%) and transport and
communication (6%). Agricultural business and
government agencies are not included. Moreover,
the survey includes only a relative small number,
5%, of very small firms (less than 5 employees). 
Table I presents descriptive statistics on the key
variables of our analysis. We include investment
data, financial structure indicators, and informa-
tion concerning profitability (in terms of return on
assets) and problems in attracting external finance.
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TABLE I
Descriptive statistics
Mean Median σ n
Total investment/Sales 008.462 03.102 018.245 0766
Investment in buildings/Sales 004.126 00.000 019.838 0763
Investment in fixed assets/Sales 004.881 02.174 008.378 0763
Replacement investment 057.436 60.000 032.025 0934
Expansion investment 041.729 40.000 031.792 0934
Solvability (%) 040.587 35.000 026.726 0761
External finance (%) 077.229 80.000 023.949 0245
Expected return on assets (%) 025.374 15.000 028.102 0546
Size (employees in 1999) 102.06 35.000 318.57 1070
Sales (million guilders) 058.463 11.000 382.89 0846
Mean and median values in percentages (except for sales), σ = standard deviation, n = number of observations. All Total
investment/Sales observations are positive. 
Size (% number of employees in 1999, n = 1070) Problems in getting external finance (%, n = 271)
– ≤ 10 11.21 – many 02.21
– ≤ 25 40.84 – some 06.27
– ≤ 50 63.64 – indifferent 19.56
– ≤ 100 83.46 – a few 38.75
Current profitability (%, n = 1064) – very few 33.21
– too low 19.27
– reasonable 31.95
– good 42.86
– not applicable 05.92
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We note that there is a significant negative corre-
lation between solvability and external financing
(partial correlation coefficient is –0.25, which is
significant for this sample size at the 95% confi-
dence interval). 
Next we turn to measuring uncertainty. In line
with Guiso and Parigi (1999) and Pattillo (1998)
we have asked entrepreneurs about their expected
sales in 2002 vis-à-vis sales in 1998. For each
expected change in sales presented in Table II
entrepreneurs are requested to provide the likeli-
hood of the change on a scale of 0–100. Hence,
firms give a density forecast of expected sales.
The answers to this question are used to proxy the
conditional mean and variance of the growth rate
of sales 3 years ahead. In order to do that, we
assume that the central values of the open inter-
vals more than 20% and less than 20% are 50 and
30 percent, respectively. The distribution is
assumed to be uniform within the intervals.
The conditional mean (CMEAN) and the con-
ditional variance (CVAR) are measured by:
CMEAN = (1 + de)S0 (1)
CVAR = vare (S0)2 (2)
S0 are sales (in guilders) in the base year (1998),
and de and vare are the expected mean and
variance of the growth rate of sales computed from
the answers given in Table II. 
The coefficient of variation of expected sales
(COEFV) is a proxy for uncertainty. It is defined
as the standard deviation divided by the mean of
the distribution: COEFV = √CVAR/CMEAN. It is
good to note that relative sales growth (defined by
CMEAN minus the actual 1998 sales over the 1998
sales) is positively correlated (0.26) with the
measure of the mean of uncertainty COEFV. It is
quite commonly assumed that an increase in
uncertainty implies a mean-preserving spread in
uncertainty (which is not completely true in our
sample, given the previous statement). Table III
gives a frequency distribution of COEFV for all
firms that have completed the questionnaire. Note
that 167 firms reported no uncertainty: we will
treat these cases with special care hereafter. In the
remainder of this paper we will use the COEFV as
well as the ratio of the conditional variance and
the conditional mean CVAR/CMEAN. We label this
ratio COEFV2. Table III gives the descriptive
statistics for the uncertainty variables. As can be
seen by comparing the mean and the median, the
Robert Lensink et al.
TABLE II
Subjective density of expected growth of sales
Sales development 1998–2002 Probability









Decrease of more than 20%
Total amount of points 100
TABLE III
Conditional mean and variance of sales
The conditional mean (CMEAN) and the conditional variance
(CVAR) of sales are measured by:
CMEAN = (1 + de)S0
CVAR = vare (S0)2
S0 are sales in the base year (1998), and de and vare are the
expected mean and variance of the growth rate of sales
computed from the answers given in Table II. COEFV is
defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean of
the distribution: COEFV = √CVAR/CMEAN. COEFV2 =
CVAR/CMEAN. CMEAN, CVAR in million guilders, COEFV
and COEFV2 in percentages. The number of observations is
842.
Frequency distribution
Interval Number of firms Frequency
0 167 019.8
0 < COEFV < 0.1 179 021.3
0.1 < COEFV < 0.2 093 011.0
0.2 < COEFV < 0.5 064 007.6
0.5 < COEFV < 1 063 007.5
1 < COEFV < 1.5 094 011.2
1.5 < COEFV < 2 061 007.2




CMEAN 68.079 12.485 459
CVAR 6.76E+5 6.32E+5 1.84E+7
COEFV 0.767 0.166 1.031
COEFV2 127 0.477 1590
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distribution of all uncertainty variables is skewed.
In the next section we relate the investment deci-
sions of the firms with the uncertainty measures. 
4.  Model specification and estimation results
In this section we present models that relate
investment of the firm to measures of uncertainty.
We include two types of models. First we estimate
investment choice models: what is the probability
that the firm invests at all? Secondly, we present
models that explain the level of investment, if the
firm invests. These two approaches can lead to
conflicting results. It might be so that firms are
stimulated to invest, but at a lower level, if uncer-
tainty is prominent. So including both models
enhances our understanding of growth decisions. 
The literature offers a wide range of investment
models. The majority of these models cannot be
used though, because our survey does not include
balance sheet information. This excludes for
instance the use of Tobin’s Q. Moreover we have
no information on the dynamics of investment (no
information on adjustment costs), which seriously
limits our class of applicable models. We there-
fore estimate a simple reduced-form accelerator
type of investment model including an uncertainty
term. The expected growth rate of sales represents
future profitability of the firm. The probit-model
is specified as follows:
Prob(INVi = 1) = a1 DSAL/SAL + a2 UNC+ a3
(3)
where INVi is the ratio between a certain measure
i of investment. We include four definitions of
investment:
1) INV1 refers to the total value of investment;
2) INV2 refers to investment in buildings;
3) INV3 refers to investment in fixed assets;
4) INV4 refers to the largest investment project of
the firm. 
Prob(INVi = 1) represents the probability of
positive investment of type i. DSAL is the change
in sales (measured as the conditional mean of
sales, CMEAN, minus the 1998 value of sales
SAL). UNC is the uncertainty proxy. 
In Table IV we present the estimation results
for model (3). We include two panels: Panel A for
the COEFV and Panel B for the COEFV2-measure
of uncertainty. Moreover we include two sets of
results in each panel. In the upper lines we exclude
the cases for which the firm reports no uncertainty
(see Table III: 167 firms report no uncertainty),
in the lower lines we include the zero-uncertainty
cases. Panel A demonstrates a slight positive
impact of COEFV on the decision to invest in a
large project (INV4) in the model where we
exclude the zero-uncertainty case. If we include
the zero-uncertainty observations we find a sig-
nificant positive impact of uncertainty in general.
This implies that the firms that report no uncer-
tainty are less eager to invest. Panel B only shows
a significant positive sign for the investment in
buildings (the other results being insignificant).
So our main conclusion from the probit regres-
sions is that if there is an impact of uncertainty
on the decision to invest or not it is a positive
one (experimenting with a logit specification gave
similar results). In general, as Sarkar (2000)
shows, an increase in uncertainty increases the
probability of hitting the threshold (which itself
depends on uncertainty), which would stimulate
investment to a certain extent. To summarise, the
results of the probit-estimation in general seem to
provide some support for a positive sign of the
decision to invest-uncertainty relationship.
Next we turn to the size of the investment
project undertaken. For positive investment deci-
sions we model:
INVi/SALES = a1 DSAL/SAL + a2 UNC + a3
(4)
where i = 1, . . . , 4 and INV1 = total value of
investment; INV2 = total investment in buildings;
INV3 = investment in machinery; INV4 = largest
investment project; DSAL = CMEAN-sales in 1998
(SAL), and UNC is the uncertainty measure. Model
(2) is the continuous version of the discrete choice
model (1). Table V presents the results for the
size of investment of firms that do invest. We
exclude extreme observations by assuming that
INVi/SALES < 0.5, for i = 1, . . . , 4. We again
present the results for the models including
positive observations for the uncertainty proxy
only (excluding the 167 observations with
COEFV = 0 from Table III) in the upper half of
Panels A and B, and results for models that
include the zero-uncertainty cases in the lower part
of both panels. We again include the indicators of
Uncertainty and Growth of the Firm 385
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TABLE IV
Investment under uncertainty: Probit specification
The model estimated reads:
Prob(INVi = 1) = a1 DSAL/SAL + a2 UNC + a3
where i = 1, . . . ,4 and UNC is the uncertainty measure. INV1 = total value of investment; INV2 = total investment in buildings;
INV3 = investment in fixed assets; INV4 = largest investment project; DSAL = CMEAN-sales in 1998 (SAL), LL is the loglikeli-
hood. Sales uncertainty is measured by COEFV (Panel A) and COEFV2: the conditional variance (Panel B). We report results
for COEFV2 > 0 in the upper half of the panel; in the lower part we include the COEFV = 0 and COEFV2 = 0 observations as
well (uncertainty variables indicated by COEFV0 and COEFV20 respectively). Standard errors are within parentheses.
Panel A – Sales uncertainty measured by COEFV
INV1 INV2 INV3 INV4
DSAL/SAL 0.852 0.872 0.797 0.458
(0.651) (0.418) (0.552) (0.500)
COEFV 0.061 0.077 0.067 0.104
(0.073) (0.053) (0.072) (0.068)
Intercept 1.143 –0.248 1.110 0.900
(0.096) (0.077) (0.095) (0.086)
LL –211.35 –422.01 –220.15 –278.44
# INVi = 0 65 321 69 99
# observations 675 618 675 675
DSAL/SAL 0.442 0.661 –0.013 0.186
(0.371) (0.295) (0.347) (0.330)
COEFV0 0.115 0.097 0.158 0.150
(0.065) (0.046) (0.064) (0.059)
Intercept 1.109 –0.248 1.083 0.863
(0.081) (0.067) (0.080) (0.074)
LL –281.02 –520.36 –301.41 –366.35
# INVi = 0 89 402 99 135
# observations 842 762 842 842
Panel B – Sales uncertainty measured by COEFV2
INV1 INV2 INV3 INV4
DSAL/SAL 1.113 0.980 1.070 0.861
(0.515) (0.380) (0.505) (0.448)
COEFV2*E-10 –0.675 3.898 –0.593 –0.557
(0.496) (1.822) (0.413) (0.428)
Intercept 1.177 –0.224 1.146 0.949
(0.090) (0.073) (0.089) (0.082)
LL –209.53 –420.27 –218.71 –278.11
# INVi = 0 65 321 69 99
# observations 675 618 675 675
DSAL/SAL 0.636 0.737 0.207 0.434
(0.365) (0.287) (0.341) (0.323)
COEFV20*E-10 –0.608 4.368 –0.511 –0.495
(0.441) (1.835) (0.373) (0.390)
Intercept 1.170 –0.214 1.165 0.937
(0.076) (0.063) (0.075) (0.069)
LL –280.80 –519.13 –220.15 –368.51
# INVi = 0 89 402 99 135
# observations 842 762 842 842
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TABLE V
Investment under uncertainty: Size of investment
The model estimated reads:
INVi/SALES = a1 DSAL/SAL + a2 UNC + a3
where i = 1, . . . ,4 and INV1 = total value of investment; INV2 = total investment in buildings; INV3 = investment in fixed assets;
INV4 = largest investment project; DSAL = CMEAN-sales in 1998 (SAL), UNC is the uncertainty measure, F is the
F-value, R2 is the adjusted determination coefficient. White-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. The sample is restricted
to INVi/SALES < 0.5, INVi > 0, and COEFV2 > 0. In the upper half of the panels we report the results for COEFV2 > 0. In the
lower parts we include comparable results for uncertainty measures that include COEFV = 0 and COEFV2 = 0 cases (COEFV0
and COEFV20 denote the uncertainty measures respectively). Standard errors are within parentheses.
Panel A – Sales uncertainty measured by COEFV
INV1 INV2 INV3 INV4
DSAL/SAL 0.060 0.044 0.040 0.062
(0.029) (0.042) (0.023) (0.025)
COEFV –0.000 0.003 –0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Intercept 0.052 0.035 0.039 0.032
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
R2 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.015
F 2.986 1.502 2.056 5.296
# observations 592 289 601 562
DSAL/SAL 0.079 0.071 0.039 0.071
(0.022) (0.035) (0.017) (0.020)
COEFV0 –0.003 –0.002 –0.002 –0.003
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Intercept 0.054 0.041 0.041 0.036
(0.041) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
R2 0.018 0.009 0.006 0.022
F 7.691 2.576 3.054 8.636
# observations 731 351 735 690
Panel B – Sales uncertainty measured by COEFV2
INV1 INV2 INV3 INV4
DSAL/SAL 0.072 0.067 0.048 0.070
(0.026) (0.040) (0.020) (0.021)
COEFV2*E-10 –0.275 –0.215 –0.216 –0.140
(0.061) (0.063) (0.048) (0.067)
Intercept 0.053 0.038 0.039 0.032
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
R2 0.021 0.016 0.018 0.022
F 7.490 3.408 6.585 7.165
# observations 592 289 601 562
DSAL/SAL 0.081 0.072 0.042 0.071
(0.021) (0.033) (0.016) (0.018)
COEFV20*E-10 –0.296 –0.244 –0.220 –0.163
(0.064) (0.068) (0.047) (0.069)
Intercept 0.054 0.041 0.041 0.036
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
R2 0.029 0.021 0.017 0.062
F 11.994 4.734 7.205 11.041
# observations 731 351 735 690
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sales uncertainty: the coefficient of variation
(COEFV) and the conditional variance over the
conditional mean (COEFV2). All variables are
scaled by sales to avoid heteroskedasticity
(moreover we use the White-corrected standard
errors).
What can be concluded from Table V? First we
note that the uncertainty variable defined by the
conditional variance over the conditional mean
performs by far better than the coefficient of
variation (the latter is not significant in any regres-
sion). Secondly, the accelerator model is relevant
in all models with COEFV2. The fit of the Panel
B-models is better than the corresponding models
in Panel A. Thirdly, the disaggregation of the
equation for total investment into separate
equations for investment in buildings and invest-
ment in machinery does not add any new insights
in Panel B (as it was the case in Table VI Panel
B). And lastly, uncertainty has a negative impact
on the size of investment, no matter what the type
of investment is. This holds for both the results
that include or exclude the zero-uncertainty obser-
vations. So Table IV illustrates a weak positive
impact of uncertainty on reaching the hurdle,
while Table V shows the negative impact of uncer-
tainty on the size of investment projects. This
would imply that the Sarkar-model (see Sarkar,
2000) works in explaining the hurdle-effect of
uncertainty, while the more traditional explana-
tions of the impact of uncertainty apply to the size
of investment.
5.  The impact of financial structure and size 
of the firm
In the previous section we analysed the impact of
sales uncertainty on the investment decisions of
the firms. The main conclusions are that more
uncertainty triggers investment more, but investing
firms invest less (excluding investment in build-
ings). In this section we analyse the role of both
the financial structure and the size of the firm. It
might be that firms in financial problems behave
differently from healthy firms. It might also be
true that small firms behave differently than bigger
firms. We first discuss the financial structure, next
we analyse the size effects.
5.1. Financial structure
It is widely known that financial imperfections let
investment decisions be conditional on financial
structure. The most famous examples of the
relevance of financial structure are the role of the
debt-equity ratio in explaining either under- or
over-investment, and the alleged impact of the
wedge between the price of external and internal
capital on investment (leading to under-invest-
ment). Concerning the former it might be so that
firms with a large proportion of debt relative to
equity are either restrained in their investment
Robert Lensink et al.
TABLE VI
Financial structure of the firm
We estimate the probability that the firm invests in a large
project:
Prob(INV4 =1) = a1 DSAL/SAL + a2 COEFV2 + a3
where INV4 = 1 if the firm notifies a large investment. DSAL
= CMEAN-sales in 1998 (SAL), COEFV2 is the uncertainty
measure. LL is the log-likelihood. Standard errors are within
parentheses.
Panel A – Solvability






# INV4 = 0 46 33
# observations 233 236
Panel B – Current return on assets
Here we use the answers as presented in Table II concerning
current satisfaction with respect to profitability.
Current profitability is:






# INV4 = 0 71 62
# observations 431 404
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through high interest obligations (under-invest-
ment) or behave strategically and over-invest
(given the limited liability of debt) at the expense
of debt holders. Concerning the wedge between
the price of external and internal capital, it is
generally believed that a higher wedge will force
the firm to rely more on internal cash flow. A lack
of cash flow will therefore limit investment. It is
not clear ex ante how these financial conditions
will influence the investment-uncertainty rela-
tionship though. But it is likely that the role of
the financial structure is not neutral. Compare e.g.
a firm with a high debt-to-assets ratio and a firm
with a normal leverage. Both firms face uncer-
tainty and suppliers of financial capital are risk
averse (think of a bank that provides a new loan).
Leverage indicates most likely financial distress
for the firm with a large proportion of debt. An
increase in uncertainty faced by the firm might
lead to credit rationing by the bank, leading to
lower investment. If the financier is risk neutral
and the firm manager is risk neutral though an
increase of uncertainty might lead to additional
investment and risk taking (given limited liability).
We have two general indicators of financial
structure available: solvability and satisfaction
concerning current return on assets (see the results
in Table I). Moreover for the largest investment
project we know the percentage of external finance
and the trouble in getting finance for about 30
percent of the firms. We therefore proceed with
estimating probit equations for the largest invest-
ment project of the firm using COEFV2 (given the
previous results) and financial indicators and test
for the neutrality of the investment-uncertainty
relation to financial structure.
Table VI gives the results for tests of two types
of neutrality: 
• With respect to solvability: is low/high solv-
ability leading to more sensitivity of investment
for uncertainty (Panel A)?
• Satisfaction with current return on assets. Is
low profitability (and, hence, low cash flow)
affecting the investment-uncertainty relation-
ship (Panel B)?
Given the ambiguous results from the theory of
finance as sketched above it is hard to give precise
one-sided hypothesis concerning the impact of
financial structure variables. We therefore con-
centrate on the Modigliani-Miller neutrality
hypothesis: financial structure does not matter. We
estimate two cases (so two subgroups of firms) in
all models: the “good” and the “bad” case. 
For solvability we use a cut-off rate for solv-
ability of 30 per cent on the lower bound and 40
per cent on the upper bound (median value is 35
per cent). Table VI Panel A presents the estima-
tion results. We see that investment demand is
reduced through uncertainty for low solvability
firms. For high solvability firms we observe that
uncertainty has a positive effect. This would
confirm the idea of under-investment (possibly
caused by risk aversion of management and
financiers). Apparently firms with a low leverage
are able to take the risk of expansion a little more.
In Panel B we use the data as presented in Table
I concerning the impression of the managers
concerning current return on assets. The managers
gave discrete answers: current profitability is
either: (1) too low, (2) reasonable, or (3) good. We
lump (1) and (2) into the low profitability case.
Firms with high current return on assets are more
likely not to invest if uncertainty increases. Firms
with low profitability invest more with a higher
sales uncertainty. This might point at the degree
of market competition the firm faces: in compet-
itive markets, profits will be lower and investment
will increase with a higher uncertainty. 
5.2. Size
Finally we turn to the role of size of the firm. Do
smaller firms respond differently to uncertainty as
compared to larger firms? If we again review our
five elements of the investment-uncertainty sign
explanation in Section 2 and relate these to the
question of the relevance of size we can think of
the following arguments. First, smaller firms are
believed to operate in competitive markets, while
bigger firms might exert more market power. This
would imply that smaller firms are more likely to
show a positive investment-uncertainty correla-
tion. Secondly, it is likely that bigger firms invest
in larger projects, which are likely to be more
specialised and possibly hard to resell. So irre-
versibility might affect bigger firms more than
smaller firms. This implies that big firms are more
likely to show a negative investment-uncertainty
relationship. On the other hand, in smaller firms
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the probability that the owner of the firm is also
the manager increases. If we assume that in these
cases managerial decisions are more based on risk
aversion (the manager-owner is afraid to lose his
firm and job) this would imply that smaller firms
would reveal a negative investment-uncertainty
sign. Finally, it might be that small firms face
more financial constraints (the impact of this
argument on the sign of the investment-uncertainty
relationship is not clear as argued in the previous
subsection). Of the 271 firms that responded to the
question concerning financial problems 171 firms
are small firms (so 100 big firms). Small firms
reported in 30 per cent of the cases financial
problems, while big firms only reported in 24 per
cent of the cases problems in attracting external
capital.
Table VII gives the results of the probit-regres-
sions for large and small firms. We split firms into
classes based on the number of employees (less
than 50 or greater or equal to 50). Table VII shows
that the probability to invest decreases for small
firms if sales uncertainty increases. This points at
the risk aversion argument of the owner/manager
of the small firm. For larger firms we find that
investment is stimulated by an increase in sales
uncertainty. This result is in line with the general
notion that managers of bigger firms demonstrate
more risk neutral behaviour. Our results do not
support the idea that small firms have to operate
in competitive markets or bigger firms have more
irreversible investment projects (and that this
element dominates the risk aversion argument). 
6.  Conclusions
In this paper we analyse the relation between
growth of the firm and uncertainty. A special
feature of the study is that it uses data from a
survey amongst a panel of 1,100 small and
medium sized Dutch firms. This allows us to
measure uncertainty ex ante. We approximate
growth of the firm by various forms of investment.
We find a couple of results. First, we find some
evidence that an increase in sales uncertainty
triggers the investment decision in a positive
manner. Secondly, we conclude that uncertainty
measured by the conditional variance over the
conditional mean of expected sales has a signifi-
cant negative impact on the level of investment
decisions made by firm managers. The main
exception here is investment in buildings, for
which we find a positive impact of uncertainty on
the size of investment.
Finally, we conclude that low solvability and a
high current return on assets make it more likely
that the firm will respond negatively in its invest-
ment decision to an increase in sales uncertainty.
Smaller firms also have a lower probability to
invest if uncertainty increases. For future research
it is useful to get more insight into investment
dynamics. This requires that we use the same
survey for the analysis of future decisions of the
firms. Moreover we are then able to track the fore-
casting ability of the managers and see whether
managers show learning behaviour. 
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